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Introduction and summary
The avoidance of financial distress has been the sub-
ject of voluminous research and protracted debate. This
article considers the economic and legal issues sur-
rounding the treatment of firms in financial distress,
with a particular focus on the challenges posed by large
complex financial organizations (LCFOs).
The successive proposals of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee, 2001) to
revise bank capital standards, which have preoccupied
regulators’ and bankers’ attentions for several years
now, are aimed at ensuring the safety and soundness
of banks and indirectly influencing banks’ risk taking
incentives. Financial institutions have themselves been
at the forefront in the quantification and management
of risk and have developed a multitude of financial
instruments for this purpose, both for their own uses
and for the benefit of other sectors of the economy—
credit and energy derivatives1 to name two notable
recent innovations. However, while these processes
have improved, at least potentially, the management
of risk, they do not eliminate the chance of financial
distress. From time to time, even in the best of all pos-
sible economic worlds, financial firms will fail through
unforeseeable economic shocks, mismanagement, or
fraud. It is therefore somewhat surprising that this in-
evitable, though hopefully rare, eventuality has been
so little analyzed by economists. For what happens
when a firm fails determines at least in part the arrange-
ments entered into when the firm is solvent and con-
strains the actions of various interested parties when
the firm becomes distressed.
This article provides an overview of the legal treat-
ment of bankruptcy in the U.S. and elsewhere and con-
siders whether the structure and complexity of LCFOs
have evolved beyond simplistic corporate structures
and contract types historically anticipated in our in-
solvency legislation and common law traditions. An
important part of that evolution has been the develop-
ment of markets for nontraditional financial instruments
used to hedge risk. The involvement of large system-
ically important institutions in these markets makes it
important to consider how these contracts are treated
under insolvency and whether this affects the ability
of legal and regulatory authorities to resolve these in-
stitutions in an orderly and efficient manner.
The failure of an LCFO, of all firms, raises the
greatest concern of potential systemic consequences.
This is because financial institutions provide capital and
other financial services to all sectors of the economy
and they form the backbone of the financial markets,
markets that rely to a great extent on trust. Thus, the
failure of a financial intermediary calls into question
a multitude of business relations. In contrast, the fail-
ure of a nonfinancial corporation of comparable size
is more easily localized: Witness the recent string of
bankruptcies of technology firms that have raised no
fears of systemic risk in the usual sense of a freezing
up of financial markets, in spite of the unprecedented
size of the firms involved.
Developed financial markets are generally robust,
and the failures of small financial firms, while painful
for the creditors, rarely endanger significant numbers
of counterparties. This being widely understood, the
failure of a small financial institution raises few sys-
temic concerns.2 However, the failure of a large insti-
tution raises concerns that it will directly trigger other
failures; for example, by failing to pay its creditors,49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the insolvent LCFO may cause these other firms to be-
come insolvent.3 Furthermore, uncertainty in the mar-
kets as to who is directly affected by the failure and
to what extent may lead participants in the payments
system and the short-term capital markets to take de-
fensive measures, thus causing a general contraction
of liquidity. This in turn may lead to financial crisis
in vulnerable firms that may not even have direct ex-
posure to the firm whose failure triggered the crisis.
Because LCFOs operate across different legal juris-
dictions, the insolvency process itself creates a coor-
dination problem across the very agents (usually courts)
charged with solving the coordination problem amongst
creditors. Furthermore, for certain types of contracts,
the ability of the courts to suspend their execution
(termed “stays”) has been effectively eliminated.
As a result, LCFOs present a number of challenges
that affect the resolution process. These are broadly
issues of coordination, relating to reconciling the ob-
jectives of different regulators, legal jurisdictions, and
creditors; opacity, relating to the inability of traditional
accounting methods to provide sufficient information
about contingent liabilities in off-balance-sheet activ-
ities and portfolios of nontraditional financial instru-
ments; and time, relating to the difficulty of managing
an orderly resolution of firms that have large portfolios
of nontraditional financial instruments, some of which
are exempted from the “time out” imposed on other
counterparties in bankruptcy proceedings. I refer to
these exempted financial instruments as “special finan-
cial instruments.”4 I explore all of the issues in detail
in the following sections. While none of these issues
are unique to LCFOs, they are apt to come together with
particular severity if an LCFO becomes distressed.
A plethora of bankruptcy procedures
Early Roman personal bankruptcy procedures pur-
portedly involved dividing up the debtor and distrib-
uting the parts to the creditors if he could not pay within
a stipulated time period.5 Placing the debtor into sla-
very was an alternative and widely practiced resolution
procedure that preserved the productive capacity of
the debtor but transferred the benefits to the creditor.6
Similar thinking underlies modern corporate bankrupt-
cy processes, and these ancient solutions find their
modern equivalents in the two major outcomes to cor-
porate bankruptcy: liquidation and reorganization.
While the evolution of legal processes to deal with
bankruptcy dates back to the beginnings of written his-
tory, the analysis of these processes in an economic
framework is comparatively recent. Jackson (1982)
argues that bankruptcy procedures function to provide
a collective debt collection mechanism designed to
maximize the returns to creditors.7 If creditors are al-
lowed individually to enforce their claims, an unco-
ordinated bankruptcy proceeding involving multiple
creditors is likely to lead to the dismemberment of an
insolvent corporation and to a loss of value. Many in-
solvent firms have greater value as going concerns than
can be extracted by liquidating their physical and fi-
nancial assets. Furthermore, creditors who are suc-
cessful in seizing assets have little or no incentive to
maximize the liquidation value of those assets once
their own claim is satisfied, because any excess sums
must invariably be turned over to the remaining cred-
itors. The result is the classic “prisoners’ dilemma.”8
Without a credible means of ensuring cooperation
among creditors, each creditor has every incentive to
try to act in their own interest and seize what assets
they can, even though they are aware that in doing
so, they diminish the value that will be recovered by
the creditors as a group.
Corporate bankruptcy processes solve this prob-
lem by coordinating the resolution of claims. A court
(or administrator), interposed between the insolvent
firm and its creditors, imposes a “time out” to prevent
the untimely and inefficient liquidation of assets. Hav-
ing taken control of the situation, the court then deter-
mines the best method of realizing the value of the firm
(orderly liquidation of assets and/or reorganization),
ascertains the value of all creditors’ claims, and then
determines how those claims will be discharged. Of
these several steps, the power of the court (or admin-
istrator) to stay the execution of creditors’ claims on
the firm’s cash flows and assets is absolutely crucial.
The prisoners’ dilemma perspective views bank-
ruptcy law as a means of protecting creditors from each
other. An alternative perspective is that the function
of bankruptcy is to provide a means of protecting the
debtor from the creditors. In the U.S., firms that file
for protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code
enjoy considerable powers to manage the renegotiation
of their creditors’ claims. The purpose of Chapter 11
is to preserve the insolvent firm as a viable economic
entity.9 Usually the managers responsible for the in-
solvency are left in place, at least initially, to super-
vise the reorganization, subject to the oversight of the
courts. This provides managers and stockholders with
considerable leverage in negotiations: witness the con-
tinuity of managers in their jobs, the frequent violation
of seniority rights in the final settlements, and the re-
duced recovery rates for creditors.10 Critical to the suc-
cess of this procedure is the ability of courts to compel
counterparties to stay claims (for payment of debts) and
to keep contracts (for instance, for services) in force.50 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
This neat picture of the problem of insolvency and
its solutions becomes less reassuring when we con-
sider LCFOs. The first issue to come to grips with is
the philosophy underlying the treatment of creditors—
whether and how contracts and contractual provisions
will be honored by the courts in different jurisdictions.
The insolvency of an LCFO necessarily raises ques-
tions of competing jurisdictions, with potentially con-
flicting objectives. As we will see later, the treatment
of special financial instruments, and the enforceabili-
ty and effect of their termination and netting provisions,
to some extent undermines the procedural niceties
assumed in the bankruptcy procedures.
Bankruptcy laws vary across countries in their de-
tails, as one would expect, but more importantly they
vary in their underlying philosophies. This makes
reconciliation of bankruptcy codes something of a
challenge. Attempts at international harmonization of
bankruptcy laws have met with only limited success,
in part because of conflicting philosophies and legal
traditions. In 1997, the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law adopted a Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvencies, which sought to address
a limited range of issues peculiar to cross-border in-
solvencies without harmonizing bankruptcy codes in
their entirety. As a model law rather than a treaty, it
relies on individual countries to change their own codes
to conform to the model.11 In contrast, the recently
enacted European Insolvency Regulation has the ad-
vantage of being binding on European Union (EU)
members. EU countries must recognize each other’s
bankruptcy laws and insolvency administrators and
their agents. For cross-border insolvencies, the courts
of the country in which the company’s “centre of main
interest” is located will take the lead, and proceedings
in other jurisdictions will play a secondary and sup-
portive role.12
Pro-creditor versus pro-debtor systems
Broadly speaking, legal approaches to bankrupt-
cy resolution may be classified as either pro-creditor
or pro-debtor. Most of the countries that derive their
laws from the English common law tradition, includ-
ing the UK, most Commonwealth countries, and UK-
affiliated off-shore financial centers, have pro-creditor
laws, which I term “English” approaches or frameworks.
Germany, Italy, China, and Japan have similar approach-
es, though they do not share the same legal heritage.
Countries whose legal frameworks have their origins in
the Napoleonic Code are generally pro-debtor in their
approach to bankruptcy, called the “Franco-Latin”
approach. These countries include Spain, most of Latin
America, as well as much of the Middle East and
Africa. The U.S., Canada, and France have evolved
hybrid systems of laws that are broadly pro-debtor
with significant pro-creditor exceptions.
Pro-creditor bankruptcy laws recognize the right
of creditors to protect themselves against default through
ex ante contractual agreements that permit the solvent
counterparty to close out contracts and set off obliga-
tions.13 The Franco-Latin approach, on the other hand,
seeks to maximize the value of the bankrupt firm by
affirming claims due to the bankrupt firm and disavow-
ing claims made on the firm, known as “cherry picking”;
this approach often ignores ex ante contractual arrange-
ments that would favor one creditor over another.
The English (pro-creditor) and Franco-Latin (pro-
debtor) approaches have at their roots two fundamen-
tally irreconcilable concepts of fairness. The English
perspective is that it is unfair for a bankruptcy admin-
istrator to claim monies due from a solvent counter-
party under one contract, while simultaneously refusing
to make payments to the same counterparty under an-
other contract. Under English law the right to “set off”
or net multiple contracts between a solvent and an in-
solvent counterparty is a matter of common law, which
does not require prior agreement. Thus, cherry picking
is anathema to the English bankruptcy tradition. Fur-
thermore, the English tradition recognizes the right
of freely contracting parties to protect themselves
against the possibility of default by various mutually
agreed contractual arrangements, such as netting
agreements and collateral.
In contrast, the Franco-Latin approach sees ex ante
private contracting of creditor protection agreements
as creating a privileged class of claimants to the detri-
ment of the remaining creditors. Such protections per-
mit one creditor to receive greater than pro rata value
by virtue of being able to net amounts owed from the
bankrupt firm against amounts due to the bankrupt firm,
while another creditor with no offsetting position may
suffer more substantial losses. The Franco-Latin ap-
proach views set-off agreements as creating an “un-
publicized security”; this means that certain assets of
a firm may not be available to satisfy the general cred-
itors’ claims because another creditor has an undis-
closed superior claim.14 Set-off arrangements that derive
from reciprocal contracts cannot reasonably be made
known to other creditors. Therefore, the Franco-Latin
tradition views such hidden preferences as fundamen-
tally unfair. To avoid this perceived inequity, the
bankruptcy administrator in pro-debtor jurisdictions
is given powers designed to maximize the value of
assets available for pro rata distribution to all credi-
tors.15 These include the ability to separate multiple
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solvent counterparties. The administrator may also re-
quire solvent counterparties to pay amounts due to the
bankrupt firm and then stand in line for pari passu
distribution of any amounts due to them as creditors.
While these two legal philosophies are fundamen-
tally irreconcilable, pro-creditor and pro-debtor laws
frequently co-exist, though perhaps not naturally. This
happens when a fundamentally pro-debtor jurisdiction,
such as the U.S., enacts laws granting pro-creditor pro-
tection to specific types of contracts. These laws are
termed “carve outs” and provide exceptions to the
general bankruptcy code. Internationally, carve-outs
have been enacted in most relevant jurisdictions for
payments systems transactions and some nontradition-
al financial instruments. In the U.S. and some other
jurisdictions, banks and some other types of financial
institutions are also subject to carve outs from the bank-
ruptcy code that is applicable to most firms.
U.S. bankruptcy laws
Bankruptcy law in the U.S. is unusually, perhaps
uniquely, complex. The Federal Bankruptcy Code (gen-
erally referred to as simply “the Code”) governing
most corporations allows for both liquidation and re-
organization. Cases involving firms subject to the Code
are heard in special federal bankruptcy courts. The
bankruptcy code is generally pro-debtor, with some
exceptions. There is no general right of set-offs, or
netting, of obligations. Various laws have carved out
exemptions to the Code. Depository institutions (banks),
insurance companies, government-sponsored entities
(GSEs, for example, Fannie Mae), and broker/dealers
are each governed by special laws and distinct reso-
lution procedures, and certain types of financial con-
tracts receive special treatment under the Code.
Insolvent insured depository institutions are re-
solved under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA),
as amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), and subse-
quent acts.16 Closure authority for banks lies with the
appropriate regulator, depending on the bank’s charter.
Creditors cannot force a bank into bankruptcy since
banks are specifically exempted from the Code. The
appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) to administer the insolvency is mandated
for federally chartered, federally insured institutions
and is usual for state chartered, federally insured in-
tuitions. The FDIC either acts as receiver to liquidate
the bank or as conservator to arrange a workout (merger,
sale, or refinancing).
Broker dealers are also exempt from the Code and
subject to their own bankruptcy laws and procedures.
Insolvencies of insurance companies are subject to
state laws and handled by state courts.
Conflicting jurisdictions
The resolution of an LCFO will necessarily involve
multiple legal jurisdictions, which leads to two prob-
lems. The first is whether the insolvent firm should
be resolved as a single entity regardless of the location
of creditors and assets, or whether each of the several
jurisdictions in which the creditors and/or assets are
located should be treated separately. There are two basic
approaches to this fundamental question: the unitary
or single-entity approach, which treats the firm as a
whole, and the “ring-fence” or separate-entity approach,
which seeks to carve up the firm and resolve claims
in each jurisdiction separately. The second problem,
which is not unrelated to the first, is whether to con-
duct multiple proceedings in each relevant jurisdic-
tion or have one jurisdiction take the lead and other
jurisdictions defer to it. Ring fencing has the practical
advantage of placing assets at the disposal of the court
most likely to have control of them and minimizing
the dependence on cross-jurisdictional information
sharing. It also provides an admittedly crude solution
to conflicts in laws and legal objectives. In the case
of insured depository institutions, ring fencing serves
the interests of the deposit insurers by ensuring that
the insolvency of a holding company does not strip
assets out of a bank subsidiary. Potentially however,
ring fencing can make coordinated cross-border (and
cross-jurisdiction) resolutions more difficult because
it leads to differential payoffs for creditors—(domes-
tic) creditors in jurisdictions where the ratio of assets
to claims is higher will enjoy higher recoveries. Ring
fencing also leads to potentially adversarial competi-
tion among jurisdictions each seeking to maximize
the value of assets available to their own creditors—
the very problem that bankruptcy procedures are sup-
posed to solve.
British bankruptcy law takes a single-entity ap-
proach to resolving international firms, regardless of
the location of assets or the nationality of the credi-
tors. The UK court makes every effort to obtain con-
trol of all the firm’s assets, which it then divides equally
among the creditors (in a liquidation). The court makes
no distinction between domestic and foreign creditors,
even in the distribution of domestically controlled as-
sets directly under its control. Importantly, however,
UK bankruptcy law recognizes that it may be more
appropriate in some cases for another, perhaps home
country’s court to take the lead in the resolution of an
international firm. In such cases, the UK provides local
support for agents of the foreign courts, for instance
in obtaining control of assets located in the UK, so
long as the creditors are not made worse off than
they would be under a UK resolution.52 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
The U.S. approach to these issues is complex and
fragmented. Where a branch or agency of a foreign
bank becomes insolvent, a U.S. administrator can at-
tach (seize) all of the foreign parent’s assets in the U.S.
even if they are part of a different nonbank subsid-
iary. The U.S. court or administrator would ring fence
those assets and use them to satisfy domestic claims,
paying any surplus to satisfy creditors in any foreign
proceedings. This necessarily means that domestic
creditors are given precedence over foreign ones. On
the other hand, in resolving a U.S. bank, the FDIC takes
a single-entity approach and seeks to obtain control of
offshore assets. Resolution of LCFOs is further com-
plicated because in the U.S. specialized laws and pro-
cedures apply to banks, broker-dealers, and insurance
companies. Thus, where these activities are co-located
in a single holding company, the ring fencing can ap-
ply to parts of the same domestic entity. Bank subsid-
iaries are ring fenced vis-à-vis nonbank subsidiaries
of the same holding company. The FDIC may seize
the assets of affiliated banks (subsidiaries of the same
holding company), while federal bankruptcy courts
would take control of the assets of an insolvent par-
ent bank holding company. Then, the FDIC may be
able to recover assets from the holding company and
nonbank affiliates under the “source of strength” pro-
visions of applicable law.
As I discussed in the introduction, a particular area
of concern in the resolution of LCFOs is the treatment
of special financial instruments, specifically the ability
to terminate and net contracts. In the following section,
I provide an overview of the issues involved and their
potential impact.
Termination and netting of contracts17
The distinctions between pro-creditor and pro-
debtor philosophies are particularly important in the
cases of payments systems and derivatives markets.
In most business relations, netting and set-off are not
significant issues. Generally, firms either buy from or
sell to other firms, but rarely do both simultaneously.
So, in the event of bankruptcy, few if any contracts
could be netted or set-off. However, financial mar-
kets can generate huge numbers of bi-directional trans-
actions between counterparties. Interbank payments
systems involve banks sending each other funds to
clear thousands of transactions throughout the day, and
the direction and amount of individual transfers are
unpredictable. The gross amounts of such transactions
are huge, but at the end of the day the net transfers are
relatively modest. Similarly, many large commercial
and investment banks make markets in special finan-
cial instruments and hedge their positions with each
other. Again the gross positions are huge, but the net
positions are modest.18
There are two types of netting rules. Those that
apply in the course of ordinary business—payments
netting, also called settlement netting or delivery net-
ting—and those that apply in resolutions of insolvent
firms—close-out netting, also called default netting,
open-contract netting, or replacement contract netting.
Close-out netting agreements consist of two related
rights: the right of a counterparty to unilaterally terminate
contracts under certain prespecified conditions, and the
right to net amounts due at termination of individual
contracts in determining the resulting obligation be-
tween (now former) counterparties. Wood (1994) points
out that payments netting is meaningless unless it is le-
gally supported by close-out netting rights in the event
of default by one of the counterparties. In the U.S. and
some other jurisdictions, the governing contracts typ-
ically contain terms stipulating the actions to be taken
in the event of default. In other jurisdictions, such as
the UK, a common law netting right exists.
Both payments and close-out netting are widely
seen as reducing systemic risk by limiting counterpar-
ty exposures to net rather than gross exposures. This
in turn makes the operation of financial markets more
efficient. Because counterparties can safely hold less
capital against individual counterparties, they can ex-
pand their gross positions while limiting their net firm-
wide exposures, resulting in increased market liquidity
(and higher revenues) for a given level of economic
capital. Furthermore, they may be more willing to
transact with potentially troubled counterparties so
long as their net position remains favorable, thus
keeping credit and risk-management channels open.
Close-out netting termination rights allow for the
early resolution of claims and reduce the uncertainty
associated with the failure of a counterparty. This is
critically important in the case of special financial in-
struments, because the value of these contracts can
change rapidly and delays in settling claims may al-
ter the eventual payouts. Termination also allows the
solvent counterparty to replace contracts with the in-
solvent counterparty with new contracts with a sol-
vent counterparty, thus ensuring the continued
effectiveness of their hedging and trading strategies.
These benefits have been widely acknowledged
by regulators, trade groups, and market participants.19
The adoption of the pro-creditor approach for these
types of markets is an implicit recognition that the equi-
ty arguments of the Franco-Latin framework are incon-
sistent with the contractual and legal certainty needs
of modern financial markets. While collateral arrange-
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one creditor over another in the event of insolvency,
these arrangements make it possible for creditors to
better measure and manage their exposures.20 Under
pro-debtor laws, all creditors may share equally in the
losses, but no creditor could know beforehand what
their expected losses might be.
The widespread adoption of carve-outs, providing
pro-creditor protection for payments systems and de-
rivatives securities, particularly in the form of collat-
eral arrangements and netting agreements, represents
one of the great successes in international legal harmo-
nization. This process has been shepherded by the In-
ternational Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
a trade group that coordinates industry documentation
practices, drafts model contracts, and lobbies for leg-
islative changes to support the enforceability of those
contracts. Central to the ISDA approach to netting is
the concept of a master agreement that governs trans-
actions between counterparties. The Master Agreement
constitutes the terms of the agreement between the
counterparties with respect to general questions unre-
lated to specific economic transactions: credit support
arrangements, netting, collateral, definition of default
and other termination events, calculation of damages
(on default), documentation, and so forth. This Master
Agreement constitutes a single legal contract of indefi-
nite term under which the counterparties conduct their
mutual business. Individual transactions are handled
by confirmations that are incorporated by reference
into the Master Agreement. This device of placing in-
dividual transactions under a single master agreement
that provides for netting of covered transactions has the
effect of finessing the problem of netting under vari-
ous bankruptcy codes. Having only a single contract
between each pair of counterparties to a Master Agree-
ment eliminates the problem of netting multiple con-
tracts. 21 Netting legislation covering special financial
instruments has been adopted in most countries with
major financial markets (the UK being a notable ex-
ception, where netting has long been provided for in
the bankruptcy code), and ISDA has obtained legal
opinions supporting their Master Agreements in most
relevant jurisdictions.
Payments netting
Payments netting is a method of reducing exposures
in the event of default. Payments netting agreements
appear in most standardized special financial instru-
ments contracts (for instance, ISDA Master Agreements),
and various forms of netting are incorporated in the
settlement procedures of payments clearing houses.
Payments netting occurs when firms, primarily
financial institutions, are exchanging payments on a
regular basis and net the amounts due against those to
be received at the same time and transfer the difference.
Payments netting reduces the so-called Herstatt Risk
that one party will make a payment and the other party
default before the offsetting payment is made. 22 The
importance of payments netting and payments systems
in general has become widely understood since the
default of Herstatt Bank in 1974 focused the attention
of market participants and regulators. The benefits of
payments netting are uncontroversial, though there is
considerable debate about the optimal structure of
payments netting arrangements.
Close-out netting
Close-out netting involves not only the treatment
of payments netting agreements for unwinding inter-
rupted bilateral payments flows, but also the treatment
of outstanding contracts between solvent and insolvent
counterparties.23 The netting of obligations in the event
of default is the subject of considerable legal debate
and differences in laws, as is the related issue of ter-
mination rights.
In general, close-out netting involves the termi-
nation of all contracts between the insolvent and a sol-
vent counterparty. Broadly speaking, there are two
relevant classes of contracts: Executory contracts are
promises to transact in the future (but where no trans-
action has yet occurred), such as a forward agreement
to purchase foreign currency; other contracts, such as
a loan, where a payment by one party payment has
already occurred, I refer to as “non-executory contracts,”
since no single legal description applies. These two
types of contracts are treated differently under close-
out netting in jurisdictions where such laws apply.
Where close-out netting is permitted, the general
procedure is that upon default or contractually agreed
“credit event,” 24 executory contracts are marked-to-
market and any payments due from acceleration of
terminated non-executory contracts are determined.
These values are then netted and a single net payment
is made. If the solvent counterparty is a net creditor,
the solvent counterparty becomes a general creditor
for the net amount. Usually, the solvent counterparty
determines the values of the contracts being terminated
and payments owed. These computations are subject
to subsequent litigation. However, disputes over the
exact valuation do not affect the ability of the solvent
counterparty to terminate and replace the contracts
with a different counterparty.
Non-executory contracts, such as loans, may
contain clauses that permit the creditor to accelerate
future payments—for instance, repayment of loan
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stipulated credit event. Acceleration is not netting per
se but a precursor to netting and determines in part
the amounts due.
The handling of non-executory contracts where pay-
ments are due to the insolvent counterparty depends
on the contract terms and legal jurisdiction. The most
common treatment is to accelerate all contracts between
solvent and insolvent counterparties when determin-
ing net obligations. In countries where it is permitted,
for instance the UK, walk-away clauses permit the
solvent counterparty to simply terminate without pay-
ment any contracts where payments are due to the in-
solvent counterparty.
Whereas non-executory contracts may be accel-
erated in insolvency, executory contracts are terminated.
Termination cancels the contract with appropriate com-
pensation, usually the cost of reestablishing the con-
tract on identical terms with another counterparty.
Acceleration and termination change the amounts
immediately due to and from the solvent counterpar-
ties vis-à-vis what would have been currently due had
the credit event (default, downgrade) not occurred.
Terminations of contracts with the resulting demands
for immediate payments may precipitate financial col-
lapse of a firm and make it impossible to resolve the
firm in an orderly manner or to arrange refinancing.25
For this reason, many jurisdictions limit the rights of
counterparties to enforce the termination clauses in
their contracts. The court can impose a stay, which does
not invalidate termination clauses in contracts but rather
overrides them, perhaps temporarily, at the discretion
of the court or an administrator. Staying contracts keeps
them in force; normal payments are still due. This is
unlike cherry picking, which involves disavowing un-
favorable contracts and forcing the counterparties to
become general creditors for the firm.
U.S. legal treatment of close-out netting
Although close-out and netting are two separate
issues, they are intimately linked in the case of special
financial instruments. Close-out refers to the termination
of contracts, while netting refers to the setting off of
multiple claims between solvent and insolvent coun-
terparties. For most contracts these are separate issues.
In the U.S., stays of indefinite term are automatic
for most contracts when a corporation files for protec-
tion under the Code.26 Furthermore, netting of most
contracts is not generally recognized under the Code,
thus cherry picking is permitted. However, as noted
earlier, various carve-outs or exceptions provide spe-
cial netting and termination rights for certain financial
contracts and certain types of counterparties. In gen-
eral, for financial contracts governed by ISDA and
similar master netting agreements, cherry picking is
prevented and termination rights are recognized.
Under U.S. common law, when a bank depositor
also has (performing) loans outstanding with the bank,
the amount of uninsured deposits may be netted against
the principal outstanding on the loan in the event of
insolvency of either the bank or a bank borrower. Where
the defaulting party is a corporation or a nationally
chartered bank, federal laws apply.27 For state-chartered
banks, state law applies.28 While the common law prin-
ciple of netting of certain bank depositor obligations
is widely recognized, it is still subject to legal uncer-
tainties and is narrow in scope (may be applicable only
to “deposits” and “indebtedness”), thus creating poten-
tial problems for special financial instruments market
participants. This has led to the enactment of a num-
ber of specific laws governing certain types of finan-
cial contracts and certain types of financial institutions.
The Code permits netting of swap contracts and
prohibits stays of swap contracts.29 Furthermore, swap
contracts may be terminated for reasons of insolven-
cy, commencement of bankruptcy proceeding, or ap-
pointment of a trustee, though such terminations are
expressly prohibited for other types of financial con-
tracts, for instance, unexpired leases.30 Swaps are gen-
erally considered to include most derivatives contracts
entered into under ISDA and similar Master Agreements.
Thus, counterparties of firms whose insolvency is gov-
erned by the Code have some degree of protection of
their netting and termination rights, though the scope
of what qualifies as a “swap” is perhaps unclear. How-
ever, this provides no protection when the insolvent
counterparty is a bank, broker/dealer, GSE, or insur-
ance company, which would not be subject to resolu-
tion under the Code.
For insolvent insured depository institutions, FDIA
as amended by FIRREA provides for netting of “qual-
ified financial contracts” between insolvent insured
depository institutions and other counterparties regard-
less of type. The term “…‘qualified financial contract’
means any securities contract, commodity contract,
forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agree-
ment, and any similar agreement,” with the FDIC being
given the authority to make the final determination as
to which contracts qualify.31 This definition covers most
over the counter (OTC) special financial instruments
governed by ISDA and similar Master Agreements.
The FDIC, as administrator or conservator of a failed
insured depository institution, may transfer qualified
contracts to another financial institution, for instance
a bridge bank, subject to a requirement to notify the
parties involved by noon on the next-business-day.32
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pay compensatory damages, which has much the same
effect as termination initiated by a solvent counterparty.33
The FDIC has announced that it will not selectively
repudiate contracts with individual counterparties—
that is, cherry pick—but its legal obligations in this
regard are unclear. However, the FDIC may not stay
the execution of termination clauses, except where
termination is based solely on insolvency or the ap-
pointment of a conservator or receiver.34 Thus, the
takeover of a bank by the FDIC is not an enforceable
“credit event” under ISDA contracts in the U.S., so
long as there is not some other basis for terminating
an agreement, such as a failure to make a payment.
If contracts are transferred, all contracts between the
insolvent depositor institution and a given counterparty
must be transferred together, thus prohibiting cherry
picking of transferred contracts.35
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) permits enforcement
of close-out netting agreements in financial contracts
between financial institutions.36 Financial institutions
are broadly defined as “… broker or dealer, deposito-
ry institution, futures commission agent, or other in-
stitution as determined by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.”37 According to the
Federal Reserve’s criteria for determining whether an
institution qualifies (laid out in Regulation EE), the firm
must be a trader or dealer, rather than an end user, and
meet a minimum size requirement.38 For such desig-
nated financial institutions, the ability to net payment
obligations under netting agreements is quite broad
and includes close-out and termination rights written
into Master Agreements. Furthermore, the law preempts
any other agencies and courts from limiting or delay-
ing application of netting agreements, effectively pre-
venting stays of such contracts.39 However, this law
only recognizes the enforceability of netting agreements
in contracts; it does not create a general right to net
obligations. Furthermore, these provisions are limited
to contracts between designated financial institutions
and, thus, provide no protection for contracts between
financial institutions and nonfinancial institutions.
Overall, therefore, the patchwork of laws govern-
ing termination and netting of special financial instru-
ments provides some protection of close-out and netting
agreements, but remains a source of legal uncertainties.
For example, it is not clear whether unenumerated
special financial instruments such as credit, equity,
energy, and weather derivatives would fall under the
rubrics of either “swap” or “qualified financial contract.”
Furthermore, the enumerated classes of covered coun-
terparties—stockbrokers, financial institutions, and
securities clearing agencies—fail to cover all important
financial market participants. The FDIC’s various rights
under FDICIA remain unclear and untested in the courts.
Attempts have repeatedly been made to clarify these
questions going back at least to 1996. Most recently,
both the House and Senate passed broadly similar bills
(H.R. 333 and S. 420) to address these issues as part
of a larger reform of the Bankruptcy Code. These
efforts are strongly supported by trade groups, the
Federal Reserve, and the Treasury. However, the re-
sulting piece of legislation failed to pass due to unre-
lated political considerations.
Other issues in resolving LCFOs
As noted earlier, bankruptcy, and in the U.S., bank
resolution procedures are predicated on the orderly
liquidation or reorganization of a troubled firm under
the supervision of a court, an administrator, or in the
case of U.S. banks, the FDIC. The first step is to stay
the exercise of most claims against the firm while the
administrator ascertains assets and liabilities, determines
the validity of claims, realizes the value of assets, and
pays off creditors in a liquidation or negotiates with
creditors to arrange a reorganization. These procedures
take considerable time, sometimes even years.40
The issues discussed above were largely related
to coordination—across competing legal and regula-
tory jurisdictions. Next, I discuss some additional is-
sues complicating the bankruptcy process for LCFOs.
These issues fall into two general categories—opaci-
ty and time.
Opacity
LCFOs tend to be informationally opaque to out-
siders because accounting methods are not designed
to provide detailed information about contingent lia-
bilities embedded in off-balance-sheet activities and
nontraditional financial instrument portfolios. More
importantly, for the purposes of failure resolutions, this
detailed information is often unavailable to insiders
as well. Rather, much of the information available to
managers, counterparties, and regulators and/or courts
is of a summary nature. LCFOs tend to manage their
activities in a decentralized manner. Firm-wide coor-
dination and risk management are usually based on
summary information of profits, losses, risk exposures,
and so forth passed up from the divisions to the head
office(s). This summary information, where it is cor-
rectly structured, should be sufficient for normal risk-
management purposes. However, in the event of
financial distress, when the firm or an administrator
seeks to sell off the special financial instruments posi-
tions, more detailed information is needed. The problem
of decentralized information is sometimes exacerbat-
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from recent mergers. Few large complex firms are in
a position to rapidly provide detailed firm-wide infor-
mation about individual positions at a level of detail
sufficient for a potential buyer to make an informed
valuation.41 The result is that buyers will only purchase
a special financial instruments book at a price well
below the true market value, since in effect they are
buying a grab bag of contracts with only a vague idea
of the contents.
Time
Banking regulation frequently seeks to avoid the
resolution process by having regulators become in-
creasingly involved in a bank’s activities as it approach-
es insolvency. In the U.S. prompt corrective action
dictates a series of increasingly stronger actions that
supervisors are required to take as a bank’s capital de-
clines below the regulatory minimum. These plans for
preventing a bank from becoming insolvent presume
that the decline in a bank’s condition will be observable
and sufficiently gradual to permit timely intervention.
Prompt corrective action cannot work when perceived
asset values change rapidly, either because their true
value has been hidden and is suddenly realized or be-
cause of fluctuations in market values. Recent notable
bank failures have been the result of fraud (First
National Bank of Keystone, 1999) or incorrect valuation
(perhaps fraudulent) of derivative assets (Superior
Federal Savings Bank, 2001).
While fraud and rapid changes in asset values can
frustrate the (ex ante) procedures that managers, coun-
terparties, and regulators have adopted to prevent or
minimize the incidence of insolvencies, the treatment
of special financial instruments during an insolvency
is apt to frustrate the (ex post) procedures for the or-
derly resolution of firms with large portfolios subject
to close-out netting. The inability of insolvency admin-
istrators to effectively prevent or stay close-out of a
significant portion of the distressed firm’s contracts
means that these contracts and their related collateral
will be terminated and liquidated. This may leave the
firm so impaired as to make reorganization impracti-
cal. Attempts to prevent such close-outs “for reasons
solely of filing for protection” are unlikely to prove
effective—contracts usually provide other termination
conditions beyond the control of courts and/or regu-
lators, for instance, “due-on-downgrade” clauses, which
are likely to be triggered at the same time.
There exists some possibility that the close-out can
be preempted by selling the book, or in the case of a
bank insolvency transferring it to a bridge bank, but
these decisions must take place with incomplete infor-
mation about the assets to be sold or transferred and
under extreme time pressure—close-out can only be
postponed with the forbearance of the solvent coun-
terparties that hold the option to exercise termination
once the firm becomes sufficiently distressed. Since
large firms have multiple counterparties, the situation
is likely to be extremely unstable. The value of special
financial instruments positions is liable to change rap-
idly due to the actions of other counterparties. Once
one counterparty exercises its close-out rights, a “rush
for the exit” will inevitably develop—counterparties
will seek to liquidate their collateral and positions be-
fore the actions of  others depress prices (the “fire-sale”
effect) and their own losses increase.42 This is the same
prisoners’ dilemma that gave rise to coordinated bank-
ruptcy procedures—now recurring because removing
the stays effectively exempts special financial instru-
ments contracts from the process.
Conclusion
I have provided an overview of the bankruptcy
laws and the problems relating specifically to resolu-
tion of LCFOs within the current legal and regulatory
framework. In particular, the combination of rapidly
developing insolvency, opaque special financial instru-
ments positions, and the exemption from stays of con-
tracts has the potential to preempt the usual options
open to regulators and courts to conduct a deliberate
and well-considered (that is, leisurely) liquidation or
reorganization of an LCFO. How to ensuring appro-
priate treatment of such an institution is a subject for
future research.57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1Energy derivatives are financial contracts tied to the price of
various forms of energy and are used for hedging by energy con-
sumers and producers. Credit derivatives are financial contracts
that allow financial market participants to make loans and enter
into contracts while laying off the risk that their counterparty will
default onto other agents willing to assume that risk (for a price).
2One possible exception is when common factors lead to the fail-
ure of large numbers of small institutions generating significant
macroeconomic costs—the savings and loan crisis in the early
1980s being an example.
3Recent research suggests that this fear may be unwarranted, for
example, Furfine (2003).
4These special financial instruments include swaps, options, futures,
forward rates agreements, as well as repurchase agreements, and
various transactions cleared through clearing houses (payments
and exchange traded derivatives). Most financial contracts, how-
ever, are not exempt from insolvency stays.
5See Kennedy (1994) and Knight (1992). This process would to-
day be considered to be undesirable. Determining whether such
an insolvency procedure might have been helpful in reducing the
incidence of default is beyond the scope of this study.
6Homer (1977) notes that the Code of Hammurabi (Babylonia, circa
1800 BC) limited the term of personal slavery for debt to three
years—a liberal innovation at the time.
7Armour (2001) provides a thorough analysis of this and subsequent
analytic frameworks.
8One of the earliest “games” analyzed by game theory, the prisoner’s
dilemma in its classic form considers two suspects interrogated sepa-
rately. Each is offered freedom if they implicate their partner (provided
that their partner does not do likewise) and a maximum sentence
if their partner implicates them. If both implicate each other, they
both receive an intermediate sentence (reduced from the maximum
for “cooperating” with the authorities); and if both refuse to impli-
cate their partner, they receive a minimum sentence (say for a re-
lated offence). Because the prisoners cannot cooperate with each
other or bind each other to prior commitments to say nothing, the
inevitable outcome is that they implicate each other and receive
the intermediate sentence, whereas if they could credibly cooper-
ate they would both be better off (receive the minimum sentence).
9Kahl (2002) finds that “Chapter 11 may buy poorly performing
firms some additional time, but it does not seem to allow many of
them to ultimately escape the discipline of the market for corpo-
rate control.”
10See, among others, Franks and Torous (1994).
11As of October 2002, the model law had been adopted, at least
in part, in Eritrea, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and within
Yugoslavia, Montenegro (www.uncitral.org).
12This is rather a smaller step forward than it may appear. Conflicts
in bankruptcy laws remain and are likely to give rise to anomalies
such as French pro-debtor courts enforcing British pro-creditor
laws in subsidiary proceedings to a UK-based bankruptcy. Further-
more, the absence of mechanisms for Europe-wide registration of
creditors will make coordination of related proceedings difficult.
(See Willcox, 2002.)
13To “set off” obligations means to reduce the amount owed to a
counterparty by any amounts due from the same counterparty.
14The concept of an unpublicized security carries over to collateral
arrangements. In the U.S., the claim on the collateral must be “per-
fected” by registering it in a manner that provides other creditors
with an opportunity to learn of the claim; still, courts are likely to
disregard the agreement and retain the collateral in the estate of
the insolvent firm, thus reducing the improperly collateralized
creditor to general creditor status.
15In practice, creditors are often divided by law into classes having
different priorities. For instance, taxes and lawyers are usually paid
before suppliers. The principle of equality of distribution, as dis-
cussed in this article, should thus be thought of as applying within
a particular creditor class defined by the bankruptcy code. The
Franco-Latin concern is that collateral and netting arrangements
result in privately negotiated alteration of these priorities.
1612 USC 1811 et seq. (1989).
17The exposition in this section borrows heavily from Johnson (2000).
18In 2002, U.S. banks had total derivatives credit exposures of
$525 billion, 96 percent of which (measured by notional value)
was concentrated in seven banks. Netting reduced banking system-
wide gross exposures by 75.8 percent, a figure that had increased
from 44.3 percent in the second quarter of 1996. Still, a number
of major banks have (net) derivatives credit exposures exceeding
their risk-based capital, in the case of J. P. Morgan Chase by a fac-
tor of 589 percent. (Preceding data are from Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, 2002).
19See for instance, President’s Working Group (1999).
20The recovery of net in-the-money positions (that is, where a sol-
vent counterparty is owed money) is still subject to uncertainty,
but net positions are smaller than gross positions and can be man-
aged through adjusting net exposures.
21In some cases, there may be several Master Agreements covering
different classes of contracts and with different divisions of hold-
ing company. Thus, counterparty netting protection may be less
than complete. This has led to the development of Cross-Product
Master Agreements, in effect master Master Agreements. ISDA is
lobbying for legislative recognition of these innovations to reflect
industry risk management practices. Recent proposed changes to
the U.S. bankruptcy code have supported this idea.
22Bankhaus Herstatt was a medium-sized bank that was active in
foreign exchange markets. In 1974, it failed and was closed by
German authorities at the end of their business day. The dollar leg
of the bank’s dollar–deutschemark transactions had not cleared,
leaving its U.S. counterparties with losses exceeding $600 million.
The resulting direct losses and, more importantly, the uncertainty
as to whether the losses would lead other banks to fail (contagion)
seriously disrupted foreign exchange markets for weeks.
23An additional major issue is the treatment of collateral, which
I do not cover in this discussion.
24Termination events may include cross defaults (defaulting on
other contracts), mergers, changes in legal or regulatory status,
changes in financial condition, and changes in credit rating
(Johnson, 2000).58 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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38The size requirements are $1 billion of gross notional principal
outstanding or $100 million of gross marked-to-market value of
outstanding positions (Johnson, 2000, p. 87).
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40Franks and Torous (1994) report that in their sample of firms filing
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